In my own judgment the most
important service that I rendered to
peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world. I had become
convinced that for many reasons it was essential that we should have
it clearly understood, by our own people especially, but also by other
peoples, that the Pacific was as much our home waters as the Atlantic,
and that our fleet could and would at will pass from one to the other of
the two great oceans. It seemed to me evident that such a voyage would
greatly benefit the navy itself; would arouse popular interest in and
enthusiasm for the navy; and would make foreign nations accept as a
matter of course that our fleet should from time to time be gathered in
the Pacific, just as from time to time it was gathered in the Atlantic,
and that its presence in one ocean was no more to be accepted as a mark
of hostility to any Asiatic power than its presence in the Atlantic
was to be accepted as a mark of hostility to any European power. I
determined on the move without consulting the Cabinet, precisely as
I took Panama
without consulting the Cabinet. A council of war never
fights, and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and not to take
refuge behind the generally timid wisdom of a multitude of councillors.
At that time, as I happen to know, neither the English nor the German
authorities believed it possible to take a fleet of great battleships
round the world. They did not believe that their own fleets could
perform the feat, and still less did they believe that the American
fleet could. I made up my mind that it was time to have a show down in
the matter; because if it was really true that our fleet could not get
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it was much
better to know it and be
able to shape our policy in view of the knowledge. Many persons publicly
and privately protested against the move on the ground that Japan would
accept it as a threat. To this I answered nothing in public. In private
I said that I did not believe Japan would so regard it because Japan
knew my sincere friendship and admiration for her and realized that we
could not as a Nation have any intention of attacking her; and that if
there were any such feeling on the part of Japan as was alleged that
very fact rendered it imperative that that fleet should go. When in the
spring of 1910 I was in Europe I was interested to find that high naval
authorities in both Germany
and Italy
had expected that war would come
at the time of the voyage. They asked me if I had not been afraid of it,
and if I had not expected that hostilities would begin at least by the
time that the fleet reached the Straits of Magellan? I answered that I
did not expect it; that I believed that Japan would feel as friendly in
the matter as we did; but that if my expectations had proved mistaken, it would
have been proof positive that we were going to be attacked
anyhow, and that in such event it would have been an enormous gain to
have had the three months' preliminary preparation which enabled the
fleet to start perfectly equipped. In a personal interview before they
left I had explained to the officers in command that I believed the trip
would be one of absolute peace, but that they were to take exactly the
same precautions against sudden attack of any kind as if we were at war
with all the nations of the earth; and that no excuse of any kind would
be accepted if there were a sudden attack of any kind and we were taken
unawares.
My prime purpose was to impress the American people; and this purpose
was fully achieved. The cruise did make a very deep impression abroad;
boasting about what we have done does not impress foreign nations at
all, except unfavorably, but positive achievement does; and the two
American achievements that really impressed foreign peoples during the
first dozen years of this century were the digging of the Panama Canal
and the cruise of the battle fleet round the world. But the impression
made on our own people was of far greater consequence. No single
thing in the history of the new United States Navy has done as much to
stimulate popular interest and belief in it as the world cruise. This
effect was forecast in a well-informed and friendly English periodical,
the London
_Spectator_. Writing in October, 1907, a month before the
fleet sailed from Hampton Roads, the _Spectator said_:
"All over America
the people will follow the movements of the fleet;
they will learn something of the intricate details of the coaling
and commissariat work under warlike conditions; and in a word
their attention will be aroused. Next time Mr. Roosevelt or his
representatives appeal to the country for new battleships they will do
so to people whose minds have been influenced one way or the other. The
naval programme will not have stood still. We are sure that, apart from
increasing the efficiency of the existing fleet, this is the aim which
Mr. Roosevelt has in mind. He has a policy which projects itself far
into the future, but it is an entire misreading of it to suppose that it
is aimed narrowly and definitely at any single Power."
I first directed the fleet, of sixteen battleships, to go round through
the Straits of Magellan to San
Francisco. From thence I ordered them to
New Zealand and Australia, then to the Philippines, China and Japan,
and home through Suez--they stopped in the Mediterranean to help the
sufferers from the earthquake at Messina, by the way, and did this work
as effectively as they had done all their other work. Admiral Evans
commanded the fleet to San Francisco;
there Admiral Sperry took it;
Admirals Thomas, Wainwright and Schroeder rendered distinguished service
under Evans and Sperry. The coaling and other preparations were made in
such excellent shape by the Department that there was never a hitch, notso much
as the delay of an hour, in keeping every appointment made.
All the repairs were made without difficulty, the ship concerned
merely falling out of column for a few hours, and when the job was done
steaming at speed until she regained her position. Not a ship was left
in any port; and there was hardly a desertion. As soon as it was known
that the voyage was to be undertaken men crowded to enlist, just as
freely from the Mississippi Valley as from the seaboard, and for the
first time since the Spanish War the ships put to sea overmanned--and by
as stalwart a set of men-of-war's men as ever looked through a porthole,
game for a fight or a frolic, but withal so self-respecting and with
such a sense of responsibility that in all the ports in which they
landed their conduct was exemplary. The fleet practiced incessantly
during the voyage, both with the guns and in battle tactics, and came
home a much more efficient fighting instrument than when it started
sixteen months before.
The best men of command rank in our own service were confident that the
fleet would go round in safety, in spite of the incredulity of foreign
critics. Even they, however, did not believe that it was wise to send
the torpedo craft around. I accordingly acquiesced in their views, as it
did not occur to me to consult the lieutenants. But shortly before the
fleet started, I went in the Government yacht Mayflower to inspect the
target practice off Provincetown.
I was accompanied by two torpedo
boat destroyers, in charge of a couple of naval lieutenants, thorough
gamecocks; and I had the two lieutenants aboard to dine one evening.
Towards the end of the dinner they could not refrain from asking if the
torpedo flotilla was to go round with the big ships. I told them no, that the admirals and captains did not believe that the torpedo boats
could stand it, and believed that the officers and crews aboard the
cockle shells would be worn out by the constant pitching and bouncing
and the everlasting need to make repairs. My two guests chorused an
eager assurance that the boats could stand it. They assured me that
the enlisted men were even more anxious to go than were the officers,
mentioning that on one of their boats the terms of enlistment of most
of the crew were out, and the men were waiting to see whether or not to
reenlist, as they did not care to do so unless the boats were to go on
the cruise. I answered that I was only too glad to accept the word of
the men who were to do the job, and that they should certainly go; and
within half an hour I sent out the order for the flotilla to be got
ready. It went round in fine shape, not a boat being laid up. I felt
that the feat reflected even more credit upon the navy than did the
circumnavigation of the big ships, and I wrote the flotilla commander
the following letter:
May 18, 1908.
My dear Captain Cone:
A great deal of attention has been paid to the feat of our battleshipfleet in
encircling South America and getting to San Francisco; and it
would be hard too highly to compliment the officers and enlisted men of
that fleet for what they have done. Yet if I should draw any distinction
at all it would be in favor of you and your associates who have taken
out the torpedo flotilla. Yours was an even more notable feat, and every
officer and every enlisted man in the torpedo boat flotilla has the
right to feel that he has rendered distinguished service to the United
States navy and therefore to the people of the United States; and I wish
I could thank each of them personally. Will you have this letter read by
the commanding officer of each torpedo boat to his officers and crew?
Sincerely yours, T
HEODORE ROOSEVELT.
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HUTCH. I. CONE, U. S. N., Commanding Second Torpedo
Flotilla, Care Postmaster, San
Francisco, Cal.
There were various amusing features connected with the trip. Most of
the wealthy people and "leaders of opinion" in the Eastern cities
were panic-struck at the proposal to take the fleet away from Atlantic
waters. The great New York
dailies issued frantic appeals to Congress
to stop the fleet from going. The head of the Senate Committee on Naval
Affairs announced that the fleet should not and could not go because
Congress would refuse to appropriate the money--he being from an Eastern
seaboard State.
However, I announced in response that I had enough money
to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would
certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough
money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific. There
was no further difficulty about the money.
It was not originally my intention that the fleet should visit
Australia, but the
Australian Government sent a most cordial invitation,
which I gladly accepted; for I have, as every American ought to have, a
hearty admiration for, and fellow feeling with, Australia,
and I believe
that America should be ready
to stand back of Australia
in any serious
emergency. The reception accorded the fleet in Australia
was wonderful,
and it showed the fundamental community of feeling between ourselves and
the great commonwealth of the South Seas. The
considerate, generous, and
open-handed hospitality with which the entire Australian people treated
our officers and men could not have been surpassed had they been our
own countrymen. The fleet first visited Sydney,
which has a singularly
beautiful harbor. The day after the arrival one of our captains noticed
a member of his crew trying to go to sleep on a bench in the park.
He had fixed above his head a large paper with some lines evidently
designed to forestall any questions from friendly would-be hosts: "I am
delighted with the Australian people. I think your harbor the finest in
the world. I am very tired and would like to go to sleep."
The most noteworthy incident of the cruise was the reception given toour fleet
in Japan.
In courtesy and good breeding, the Japanese can
certainly teach much to the nations of the Western world. I had been
very sure that the people of Japan would understand aright what the
cruise meant, and would accept the visit of our fleet as the signal
honor which it was meant to be, a proof of the high regard and
friendship I felt, and which I was certain the American people felt,
for the great Island Empire. The event even surpassed my expectations. I
cannot too strongly express my appreciation of the generous courtesy the
Japanese showed the officers and crews of our fleet; and I may add
that every man of them came back a friend and admirer of the Japanese.
Admiral Sperry wrote me a letter of much interest, dealing not only with
the reception in Tokyo
but with the work of our men at sea; I herewith
give it almost in full:
28 October, 1908.
Dear Mr. Roosevelt:
My official report of the visit to Japan goes forward in this mail,
but
there are certain aspects of the affair so successfully concluded which
cannot well be included in the report.
You are perhaps aware that Mr. Denison of the Japanese Foreign Office
was one of my colleagues at The Hague,
for whom I have a very
high regard. Desiring to avoid every possibility of trouble or
misunderstanding, I wrote to him last June explaining fully the
character of our men, which they have so well lived up to, the
desirability of ample landing places, guides, rest houses and places for
changing money in order that there might be no delay in getting the men
away from the docks on the excursions in which they delight. Very few of
them go into a drinking place, except to get a resting place not to be
found elsewhere, paying for it by taking a drink.
I also explained our system of landing with liberty men an unarmed
patrol, properly officered, to quietly take in charge and send off
to their ships any men who showed the slightest trace of disorderly
conduct. This letter he showed to the Minister of the Navy, who highly
approved of all our arrangements, including the patrol, of which I
feared they might be jealous. Mr. Denison's reply reached me in Manila,
with a memorandum from the Minister of the Navy which removed all
doubts. Three temporary piers were built for our boat landings, each
300 feet long, brilliantly lighted and decorated. The sleeping
accommodations did not permit two or three thousand sailors to remain on
shore, but the ample landings permitted them to be handled night and day
with perfect order and safety.
At the landings and railroad station in Yokohama there were rest
houses or booths, reputable money changers and as many as a thousand
English-speaking Japanese college students acted as volunteer guides,
besides Japanese sailors and petty officers detailed for the purpose.
In Tokyo there were a great many excellent refreshment places, where the
men got excellent meals and could rest, smoke, and write letters, andin none of
these places would they allow the men to pay anything, though
they were more than ready to do so. The arrangements were marvelously perfect.
As soon as your telegram of October 18, giving the address to be made to
the Emperor, was received, I gave copies of it to our Ambassador to
be sent to the Foreign Office. It seems that the Emperor had already
prepared a very cordial address to be forwarded through me to you, after
delivery at the audience, but your telegram reversed the situation and
his reply was prepared. I am convinced that your kind and courteous
initiative on this occasion helped cause the pleasant feeling which was
so obvious in the Emperor's bearing at the luncheon which followed the
audience. X., who is reticent and conservative, told me that not only
the Emperor but all the Ministers were profoundly gratified by the
course of events. I am confident that not even the most trifling
incident has taken place which could in any way mar the general
satisfaction, and our Ambassador has expressed to me his great
satisfaction with all that has taken place.
Owing to heavy weather encountered on the passage up from Manila the
fleet was obliged to take about 3500 tons of coal.
The Yankton remained behind to keep up communication for a few days, and
yesterday she transmitted the Emperor's telegram to you, which was sent
in reply to your message through our Ambassador after the sailing of the
fleet. It must be profoundly gratifying to you to have the mission
on which you sent the fleet terminate so happily, and I am profoundly
thankful that, owing to the confidence which you displayed in giving
me this command, my active career draws to a close with such honorable
distinction.
As for the effect of the cruise upon the training, discipline and
effectiveness of the fleet, the good cannot be exaggerated. It is a war
game in every detail. The wireless communication has been maintained
with an efficiency hitherto unheard of. Between Honolulu
and Auckland,
3850 miles, we were out of communication with a cable station for only
one night, whereas three [non-American] men-of-war trying recently to
maintain a chain of only 1250 miles, between Auckland
and Sydney,
were
only able to do so for a few hours.
The officers and men as soon as we put to sea turn to their gunnery and
tactical work far more eagerly than they go to functions. Every morning
certain ships leave the column and move off seven or eight thousand
yards as targets for range measuring fire control and battery practice
for the others, and at night certain ships do the same thing for
night battery practice. I am sorry to say that this practice is
unsatisfactory, and in some points misleading, owing to the fact
that the ships are painted white. At Portland,
in 1903, I saw Admiral
Barker's white battleships under the searchlights of the army at a
distance of 14,000 yards, seven sea miles, without glasses, while theHartford,
a black ship, was never discovered at all, though she passed
within a mile and a half. I have for years, while a member of the
General Board, advocated painting the ships war color at all times, and
by this mail I am asking the Department to make the necessary change in
the Regulations and paint the ships properly. I do not know that any one
now dissents from my view. Admiral Wainwright strongly concurs, and
the War College Conference recommended it year after year without a
dissenting voice.
In the afternoons the fleet has two or three hours' practice at battle
maneuvers, which excite as keen interest as gunnery exercises.
The competition in coal economy goes on automatically and reacts in a
hundred ways. It has reduced the waste in the use of electric light and
water, and certain chief engineers are said to keep men ranging over the
ships all night turning out every light not in actual and immediate use.
Perhaps the most important effect is the keen hunt for defects in
the machinery causing waste of power. The Yankton by resetting valves
increased her speed from 10 to 11 1/2 knots on the same expenditure.
All this has been done, but the field is widening, the work has only
begun.
* * * * *
C. S. SPERRY.
When I left the Presidency I finished seven and a half years of
administration, during which not one shot had been fired against a
foreign foe. We were at absolute peace, and there was no nation in the
world with whom a war cloud threatened, no nation in the world whom we
had wronged, or from whom we had anything to fear. The cruise of the
battle fleet was not the least of the causes which ensured so peaceful
an outlook.
When the fleet returned after its sixteen months' voyage around the
world I went down to Hampton Roads to greet it. The day was Washington's
Birthday, February 22, 1907. Literally on the minute the homing
battlecraft came into view. On the flagship of the Admiral I spoke to
the officers and enlisted men, as follows:
"Admiral Sperry, Officers and Men of the Battle Fleet:
"Over a year has passed since you steamed out of this harbor, and over
the world's rim, and this morning the hearts of all who saw you thrilled
with pride as the hulls of the mighty warships lifted above the horizon.
You have been in the Northern and the Southern Hemispheres; four times
you have crossed the line; you have steamed through all the great
oceans; you have touched the coast of every continent. Ever your general
course has been westward; and now you come back to the port from
which you set sail. This is the first battle fleet that has ever
circumnavigated the globe. Those who perform the feat again can but
follow in your footsteps.
"The little torpedo flotilla went with you around South America, through
the Straits of Magellan, to our own Pacific
Coast. The armored
cruiser
squadron met you, and left you again, when you were half way round theworld.
You have falsified every prediction of the prophets of failure.
In all your long cruise not an accident worthy of mention has happened
to a single battleship, nor yet to the cruisers or torpedo boats. You
left this coast in a high state of battle efficiency, and you return
with your efficiency increased; better prepared than when you left, not
only in personnel but even in material. During your world cruise you
have taken your regular gunnery practice, and skilled though you were
before with the guns, you have grown more skilful still; and through
practice you have improved in battle tactics, though here there is more
room for improvement than in your gunnery. Incidentally, I suppose I
need hardly say that one measure of your fitness must be your clear
recognition of the need always steadily to strive to render yourselves
more fit; if you ever grow to think that you are fit enough, you can
make up your minds that from that moment you will begin to go backward.
"As a war-machine, the fleet comes back in better shape than it went
out. In addition, you, the officers and men of this formidable fighting
force, have shown yourselves the best of all possible ambassadors and
heralds of peace. Wherever you have landed you have borne yourselves
so as to make us at home proud of being your countrymen. You have shown
that the best type of fighting man of the sea knows how to appear to
the utmost possible advantage when his business is to behave himself on
shore, and to make a good impression in a foreign land. We are proud of
all the ships and all the men in this whole fleet, and we welcome you
home to the country whose good repute among nations has been raised by
what you have done."
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